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Salt Lake County, Duchesne County, Uintah County, and Washington 
County (the “Counties”) challenge the constitutionality of the following three 
tax laws (the “Challenged Laws”):  Utah Code sections 59-2-201(4) 
(“Valuation Law”), 59-2-804 (“Allocation Law”), and 59-2-1007(2)(b) 
(“Threshold Law”).  Although the district court dismissed the challenge to the 
Threshold Law on ripeness grounds, it determined the challenges to the 
Valuation Law and Allocation Law were ripe based on the Counties’ 
references to the 2017 tax assessment in their complaint. 
But in its Supplemental Briefing Order, the Court notes the “language 
of [the Counties’] complaint, and their arguments on appeal, suggest that the 
present case may not be sufficiently connected to the 2017 tax assessment to 
render” any of the Counties’ claims ripe for adjudication.  Supp. Order at 1-2.  
The Court therefore has asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing 
on the following four questions: 
1. Did the Counties properly allege as-applied challenges 
in addition to their facial challenges? If so, what was the 
factual basis for the as-applied challenges? 
 
2. Are the alleged facts related to the 2017 tax assessment 
in the Counties’ complaint sufficient to establish that 
the Counties have been harmed by the Challenged 
Laws? If not, does the complaint contain another factual 
basis to support a ripeness determination? 
2 
 
3. Would it be proper for the court to decide the Counties’ 
“pure[] legal questions,” in the event we find that the 
Counties’ claims are not connected to a concrete set of 
facts? 
 
4. Do any of the Counties’ claims in this case arise from 
facts stemming from a tax assessment that is not being 
challenged, or has not already been challenged, in 
another case? 
Id. at pp. 3-4 
 
 The answers to these questions demonstrate that none of the Counties’ 
claims are ripe. 
 First, the Counties allege only facial challenges.  In their complaint and 
arguments on appeal, the Counties do not take the position that the 
Challenged Laws could be constitutionally applied in certain circumstances.  
To the contrary, the Counties seek orders declaring the Challenged Laws 
unconstitutional and enjoining their enforcement without qualification. 
Second, the facts alleged in the complaint related to the 2017 tax 
assessment are not sufficient to establish that the Counties have been 
harmed by the Challenged Laws.  As shown in the State’s opening brief, the 
district court correctly determined the Counties did not allege facts showing 
the Threshold Law was applied to the 2017 tax assessment or any other 
assessment.  As shown in this supplemental brief, the same is true regarding 
the Allocation Law.  By failing to allege the Threshold Law and Allocation 
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Law have been applied, the Counties have necessarily failed to demonstrate 
they have been harmed by either law.   
As for the Valuation Law, the Counties have not demonstrated harm in 
accordance with the standard established in the Bangerter case.  That is, the 
Counties have not identified a specific tax assessment that has been reduced 
under the Valuation Law with a resulting loss of revenue to a particular 
county.  Rather, the Counties vaguely allege collective harm resulting from 
the application of the Valuation Law to tax assessments in 2017.  Even if 
these allegations might sufficiently demonstrate harm, the Counties on 
appeal have made it clear that their facial challenges give rise to purely legal 
questions that do not depend on any specific factual scenario.  By doing so, 
the Counties divorced their challenges to the Valuation Law (and other 
Challenged Laws) from any allegations of harm, which precludes the 
Counties from demonstrating their challenges are ripe.   
Third, it would not be proper for the Court to decide the Counties’ 
“pure[] legal questions” in the event the Court finds the Counties’ claims are 
not connected to a concrete set of facts.  Without a concrete set of facts 
showing the Counties were injured by the Challenged Laws, their claims are 
not ripe for adjudication. 
Fourth, based on the allegations in the complaint, it appears that none 
of the Counties’ claims in this case arise from facts stemming from a tax 
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assessment that is not being challenged, or has not already been challenged, 
in another case.  The complaint refers only to 2017 tax assessments.  And the 
record on appeal shows that 2017 tax assessments are being challenged in 
other cases.  The pendency of these other cases further supports dismissal of 
this case.  
ARGUMENT 
I. The Counties Do Not Properly Allege As-Applied Challenges. 
The Counties do not properly allege as-applied challenges in their 
complaint.  Although the Counties allege they are challenging the Challenged 
Laws both “facially” and “as applied to the 2017 tax assessments,” (R. 35-36, 
¶¶ 86, 92 93, 104, 106, 107, 114, 115, 118, 119),1 this Court is not bound by 
how the Counties characterize their challenges.  Gillmor v. Summit Cty., 
2010 UT 69, ¶ 30, 246 P.3d 102 (explaining that a party’s “as-applied” 
challenges were more properly classified as “facial challenges” because 
“nothing in [the party’s] petition alleges that there was something uniquely 
unconstitutional about the way in which the ordinances were applied to her 
particular [circumstances].”);  State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 22, 993 P.2d 
854 (discussing a defendant’s as-applied claim, which challenged a criminal 
statute’s application to the defendant based on the defendant’s mental 
illness).  Rather, the Court will reject a plaintiff’s characterization if it does 
                                                          
1 Of note, the Counties state they are appealing only their facial challenges, 
but not their alleged “as-applied” challenges.  (Appellants’ Reply Br. at 1-3). 
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not conform to the substance of the challenge.  Gilmor, 2010 UT 69, ¶ 30.  
The Court should reject the Counties’ allegations that characterize their 
challenges as as-applied challenges.  
This Court has distinguished facial from as-applied challenges.  “A 
facial challenge . . . requires the challenger to ‘establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.’”  Herrera, 
1999 UT 64, ¶ 4 n.2 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. 
Emps. Council 79 v. Scott, 717 F.3d 851, 863 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A facial 
challenge, as distinguished from an as-applied challenge, seeks to invalidate 
a statute or regulation itself.”).  Thus, in a facial challenge, “the specific facts 
related to the challenging party are irrelevant.”  People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 
118151, ¶ 36, 43 N.E.3d 984.  In contrast, “[i]n an as-applied challenge, a 
party concedes that the challenged statute may be facially constitutional, but 
argues that under the particular facts of the party’s case, ‘the statute was 
applied . . . in an unconstitutional manner.’” Gillmor, 2010 UT 69, ¶ 27 
(quoting State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, ¶ 14, 220 P.3d 136.). 
Based on this framework, the Counties’ claims raise only facial 
challenges, not as-applied challenges.  The Counties do not concede the 
Challenged Laws may be facially constitutional or that any scenario exists 
under which they are constitutional.  The Counties do just the opposite.  
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Under the heading “Nature of the Action,” (R. 6, ¶¶ 11-12), and in their 
prayer for relief, (R. 28), the Counties request orders broadly declaring the 
Challenged Laws unconstitutional and enjoining the State Tax Commission 
from applying the Challenged Laws without limitation as to the 
circumstances.  (Id. at 20).  Similarly, the Complaint is devoid of allegations 
asserting that the Challenged Laws are unconstitutional based on a 
particular quality or status, or the particular circumstances, of one or more of 
the Counties. 
II. The Allegations in the Complaint Do Not Establish that the 
Counties Have Been Harmed by the Challenged Laws. 
The facts alleged in the Complaint, including the facts related to the 
2017 tax year, fail to establish the Counties have been harmed by any of the 
Challenged Laws. 
A. Threshold Law  
As shown in the State’s opening brief (and determined by the district 
court), the Counties did not allege facts showing they have been harmed by 
the Threshold Law.  (State Br. at 14-18).  More specifically, the Counties do 
not allege the Threshold Law was applied to any tax assessment in 2017.  In 
fact, the district court concluded the Counties’ “Complaint does not contain 
any allegations regarding the application of the Review Threshold Law.” (Id. 
at 912-13).  The Counties do not dispute this conclusion.   
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As this Court stated in its Supplemental Briefing Order, “in order for a 
county to challenge the constitutionality of a particular provision in the tax 
code, the county ‘must produce a tax assessment that has been challenged 
and reduced under [the challenged provision] with a resulting loss of revenue 
to the relevant county.’”  Supp. Order at 1 (quoting Salt Lake Cty. v. 
Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1996)).  Thus, because the Counties have 
not alleged facts showing the Threshold Law was applied to a 2017 tax 
assessment or another tax assessment to the Counties’ detriment, the 
Counties’ challenges to the Threshold Law are not ripe.   
B. Allocation Law  
 
For the same reasons, the Court should conclude the Counties have not 
alleged facts related to a 2017 tax assessment or another assessment 
sufficient to establish the Counties have been harmed by the Allocation Law.   
With respect to the Allocation Law and Valuation Law, the district 
court correctly observed that the “Complaint does not set forth the specifics of 
a particular assessment . . . .”  (R.  912).  But, without citing any specific 
paragraphs or pages of the complaint, the district court concluded the 
Counties’ challenges to these laws are ripe because their complaint “alleges 
that the Commission used the Valuation and Allocation Laws to determine 
airline assessments in 2017, which resulted in reduced tax revenue from 
airlines.”  (R. 912). 
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But, on close inspection, the Counties’ complaint does not allege that 
the Commission used the Allocation Law (SB 237) in 2017 to determine 
airline assessments and cause a reduction of tax revenue to the Counties.  
The Counties’ allegations about the 2017 tax year concern only the Valuation 
Law (SB 157): 
[T]he Division in 2017 was required by the 
methodology set forth by the Legislature in SB157 to 
value airlines at an average of 39% less than what 
their values would have been using 2016 methods—
for a total loss in airline tax revenues of roughly $5 
million.   (R. 5-6, ¶ 7 (emphasis added)). 
 
The assessments issued by the State Tax Commission 
for the January 1, 2017, lien date for the seven major 
passenger airlines utilized the SB157-required 
valuation method, rather than the preferred 
valuation methods used by the State Tax Commission 
for the 2016 assessments. This significantly affected 
the assessed value of Airline Property.  For example, 
application of Utah Code section 59-2-201(4), as 
amended, reduced the 2017 assessed system value of 
one airline from $26.2 billion to less than $14.7 
billion (a roughly 44% decrease).  (R. 15, ¶ 58 
(emphasis added)). 
 
By applying the SB157 methodology rather than 
applying the methodologies used the previous year, 
the 2017 Utah taxable values for the seven major 
passenger airlines decreased by roughly 39% overall.  
(R. 15, ¶ 59 (emphasis added)).  
 
Had the State Tax Commission used the preferred 
valuation methods it used in 2016 instead of the 
SB157 methodology, the 2017 Utah taxable values 
for the seven major airlines would be on average 43% 




Thus, as is the case with the Threshold Law, the Counties have not 
alleged facts showing the Allocation Law was applied to a 2017 tax 
assessment or another tax assessment to their detriment.  Accordingly, the 
Counties’ challenges to Allocation Law are also not ripe. 
C. Valuation Law  
 
Despite the references to 2017 tax assessments in the complaint, the 
Court should conclude that the Counties’ challenge to the Valuation Law is 
not ripe.    
First, the Counties’ allegations do not satisfy the standard for 
demonstrating harm and ripeness announced in Bangerter.  Under Bangerter, 
to “render the constitutionality of [a tax law] ripe for adjudication, the 
Counties must produce a tax assessment that has been challenged and 
reduced under the [tax law] with a resulting loss of revenue to the relevant 
county.  938 P.2d at 385; id. at 386 (stating that “actual challenges to specific 
property value assessments” is “precisely what is missing here.”).  Contrary 
to this standard, the Counties do not identify a specific assessment that has 
been reduced with a resulting loss of revenue to a relevant county.  Rather, 
the Counties allege only how the Valuation Law affected them collectively.  
And the Counties do not identify which provision of the Valuation Law 
was applied in 2017.  This oversight is important because the Counties are 
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challenging two provisions of the Valuation Law, i.e., the “clear and 
convincing evidence” threshold and the “fleet adjustment.”  (State Br. at 3-4).  
The Counties must show each of these challenges are ripe.  See, e.g., Tribble 
v. Chuff, 642 F. Supp. 2d 737, 753 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (“The plaintiff must 
establish that each claim brought is ripe for judicial resolution.”).  But due to 
the vagueness of their allegations, the Counties have not demonstrated that 
either challenge is ripe. 
Further, as the Court correctly observes, although the district court 
determined the references to 2017 tax assessments were enough to render the 
challenges to the Valuation Law ripe, the Counties on appeal “appear to 
distance themselves from any specific factual scenario, and never couch their 
claims in context of the 2017 assessment.”  Supp. Order at 2.  Instead, the 
Counties “argue that their claims ‘give rise to purely legal questions,’ and 
that the tax commission ‘is precluded by law from making factual 
determinations related to the statutes’ legality or constitutionality’ because 
‘all the claims appealed present purely constitutional challenges.’”  Supp. 
Order at 2-3 (citations omitted). 
Thus, the Counties have distanced themselves from the references to 
2017 tax assessments in their complaint for the apparent strategic purpose of 
undermining the (i) district court’s rationale for dismissing the Valuation and 
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Allocation Laws on exhaustion grounds and (ii) Airlines’ arguments on appeal 
supporting dismissal on those grounds.   
As part of this strategy, the Counties state they are appealing only 
their facial challenges, but not their so-called “as-applied” challenges.  
(Appellants’ Reply Br. at 1-3).  In defense of this strategy, the Counties argue 
that they are not forced to litigate claims they have chosen not to pursue on 
appeal and the “non-appealed [as-applied] claims are not predicative of the 
facial question.”  (Id. at 1-2). 
According to the Counties, by not appealing their “as-applied” 
challenges, the remaining facial “claims on appeal posit that merely on their 
face the Challenged Laws violate the constitutional requirement for 
uniformity – those law[s] are unconstitutional at the outset such that 
dismissed claims require no administrative exhaustion.”  (Id. at 2).  By 
relying on the theory that the remaining facial claims on appeal are 
“unconstitutional at the outset,” the Counties distanced and divorced their 
claims from the allegations about the 2017 tax assessments. 
But, under this theory, the Counties’ claims are not ripe.  This Court 
has recognized only one situation where facial challenges are ripe at the 
outset:  facial challenges to regulatory takings.  Gillmor, 2010 UT 69, ¶ 31 
(stating the rule that a “facial challenge to a land use regulation becomes ripe 
upon the enactment of the regulation itself” is a limited rule that is meant to 
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apply only to “facial challenges to regulatory takings where injury to the 
plaintiff is said to occur at the moment the ordinance is enacted and the 
plaintiff’s property value is ‘taken.’”).  In other situations, like the situation 
here, a facial challenge is not ripe “at the outset”; it ripens only when the 
Challenged Law causes injury to a particular plaintiff.  Id. ¶ 33. 
By distancing their claims from the 2017 tax assessments, the Counties 
cannot demonstrate their claims are ripe.2  Thus, their challenge to the 
Valuation Law should be dismissed on ripeness grounds. 
III. The Court Should Not Decide the Counties’ Purely Legal 
Questions if it Finds They Are Not Connected to a Concrete 
Set of Facts. 
The Court should not decide the purely legal questions presented by 
Counties’ claims if they are not connected to a concrete set of facts.  Without a 
connection to a concrete set of facts, the Counties’ claims and the pure legal 
questions they present are not ripe and present only abstract questions over 
which this Court has no power to adjudicate.  Bangerter, 928 P.2d at 385 
(stating that although the “law itself is at issue” in a declaratory judgment 
action, plaintiff must still plead concrete facts showing the plaintiff suffered 
an injury to “render the constitutionality of [a tax law] ripe for 
adjudication.”); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983) 
(explaining that courts have the constitutional obligation of applying legal 
                                                          
2 This same reasoning applies to the Threshold and Allocation Laws.   
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principles “to a particular dispute”); Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of 
Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 19, 289 P.3d 582 (stating “[e]ven 
courts of general jurisdiction have no power to decide abstract questions or to 
render declaratory judgments, in the absence of an actual controversy 
directly involving rights”) (alteration and emphasis in original); see also Int’l 
Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 
224 (1954) (“Determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in 
advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case 
involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the 
judicial function.”). 
 While it may be that “pure legal questions that require little factual 
development are more likely to be ripe,” a party bringing a challenge raising 
a pure legal question must still present a “concrete factual situation” 
demonstrating the party has suffered an injury.  State v. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 368 (Alaska 2009); see Utah Transit Auth., 
2012 UT 75, ¶ 19; Philadelphia Fed’n of Teachers, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 
Local 3, AFL-CIO v. Ridge, 150 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that 
even “the presence of ‘a purely legal question’ is not enough, of itself, to 
render a case ripe for judicial review, not even as to that issue” and “plaintiffs 
must still demonstrate that they face a real and immediate threat of injury.”). 
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Thus, although a facial challenge to a statute may present a purely 
legal question, State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 27, 353 P.3d 55, the party 
asserting the challenge must still demonstrate the statute injured the party.  
Gillmor, 2010 UT 69, ¶ 33 (stating “a law may be facially attacked whenever 
it causes injury to a particular plaintiff”).  For this reason, in the context of a 
facial challenge to a tax law, this Court concluded the challenge was not ripe 
because there “were no concrete facts pleaded indicating any specific injury 
sustained or threatened to plaintiff personally.”  Bangerter, 928 P.2d at 385.  
The same result is required here. 
IV. The Counties’ Claims Do Not Arise from a Tax Assessment 
that is Not Being Challenged or Has Not Already Been 
Challenged in Another Case. 
The Counties’ claims do not arise from facts stemming from a tax 
assessment that is not being challenged or has not already been challenged in 
another case.  If cases involving the same parties and issues were pending at 
the time this declaratory judgment action commenced, it is subject to 
dismissal on that basis.  Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 1999 UT 
12, ¶¶ 7-9, 974 P.2d 286 (stating Utah law precludes a declaratory judgment 
action when the same parties are already involved in a separate 
administrative action or proceeding involving identical issues).  At present, 
Salt Lake County is raising constitutional challenges to the Threshold Law in 
four pending tax court cases, (Airlines’ Br. at 1 n.1), which are appeals from 
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Tax Commission cases filed on or about June 22, 2017.  (R. 673-74, 680-81, 
688-89, 698-98, 794, 817 n.1.).  And, in cases filed in the Tax Commission on 
or before June 22, 2017, Salt Lake County and Washington County are 
challenging tax assessments to which the Valuation Law and Allocation Law 
were applied.  (Airlines’ Br. at 1 n.1).  These two counties could raise their 
constitutional challenges to the Valuation and Allocation Laws on appeal to 
the tax court.   
This declaratory judgment action was filed on July 17, 2017.  (R. 28).  
Thus, under the rule in Hercules, the Court may limit or preclude this 
declaratory judgment action.   
CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in the State’s opening brief, 
the district court’s ruling dismissing the Counties’ complaint should be 
affirmed on ripeness grounds.  
 
      Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
/s/ Andrew Dymek     
DAVID N. WOLF 
LARON LIND 
ANDREW DYMEK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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